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By intergovernmental fiscal relations at the subnational level are meant the issues of 
assignment of revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities as well as those issues of fiscal 
capacity regulation that arise between any levels of public government within regions. But 
before proceeding to subnational tiers of government and relations among them, let us quote 
some figures illustrating the extent of inter-budgetary monetary flows in the whole of the 
Russian Federation.  
According to the estimations of the Fiscal Policy Center, the following amounts were 
remitted from the federal budget to the regional level in 1999: 364 billion Rubles of shared  
federal taxes; 44 billion Rubles of transfers from the federal Fund for Financial Support of 
Regions; about 20 billion Rubles through other channels (in form of budget loans, financing of 
earmarked programs and mutual settlements). Hence, the total amount of monetary flows 
between the federal and regional governments made up about 430 billion Rubles, or one third of 
the consolidated budget of the Russian Federation. Regional consolidated budgets comprised 
over 60 percent of funds obtained through intergovernmental channels (resources received by 
regions from the extra-budgetary funds were not taken into account). Regional budgets in their 
turn transferred 234 billion Rubles to municipalities, of which 150 billion Rubles were tax 
transfers (tax sharing) and 84 billion Rubles were allocated in form of grants. The above amount 
accounted for about 70 percent of aggregate local (subregional) budgets in the Russian 
Federation.   
The current budgetary system of the Russian Federation is built in such a way that 
involves no problems with the identification of the parties to IGFR  within the federal center/RF 
subjects context. Corresponding directly to these two tiers of government are the two levels of 
the budgetary system, whose relations are regulated by the budget and tax legislation of the 
Russian Federation. 
On the contrary, the subnational level presents quite a different picture of 
intergovernmental relations. The federal legislation on IGFR between a RF subject and local 
governments provides no clear definition for those authorities that may become partners of a RF 
subject in intergovernmental relations within a region. It should be noted that under the current 
RF tax and budget legislation and the Federal Law On General Principles of Local Self-
government Organization in the Russian Federation there are quite a number of eligible 
candidates to fulfill this purpose.  
The tax and budget legislation of the Russian Federation establishes tax and expenditure 
responsibilities for the three levels of public government. As a result, a three-level budgetary 
system has been formed in Russia. At the same time, the RF legislation on bodies of state power 
and local self-governments provides for a possible formation of additional levels of public 
government.  Currently, the administrative and territorial organization issues at the regional 
level are regulated by the Federal Law On General Principles of Organization of Legislative 
(Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Power in the RF Subjects and the Federal Law 
On General Principles of Local Self-government Organization in the Russian Federation. Owing 
to the contradictory nature of some provisions of the above laws, the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation issued a number of rulings where it provided important interpretations of the 
issues in connection with the organization of local governments.   
Ambiguous interpretations of the current legislation result in various types of local 
public administration in different regions of the Russian Federation:  
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Type I  One-tier structure of state power of a RF subject and one-tier structure of 
municipal bodies of power (at the level of large cities and raions or at the level of sub-raion 
settlements) 
Local bodies of self-government are for the most part formed on the basis of large cities 
and raions in the traditional administrative-territorial division. Municipalities enjoy the fiscal 
rights envisaged by the RF legislation for the third-tier of the budgetary system. Their fiscal 
relations with regional bodies of state power (i.e. amounts of financial assistance and tax 
sharing) are designed by regional authorities. In a number of regions the one-tier regional 
administration coexists with municipalities organized at the sub-raion level, on the basis of small 
towns and rural settlements. In this case the raion link is absent and the regional administration 
has to deal directly with several hundreds of municipalities.  
In order to execute a municipal budget in RF subjects with one-tier municipalities on the 
basis of large cities and raions, sub-municipal bodies are appointed from the above, to which 
expenditure plans are forwarded.  
 
Type II Two-tier structure of state power of a RF subject and one-tier structure of 
municipal bodies of power  
This structure is similar to the previous one except that municipalities formed at the 
below-raion level are deprived of some rights and powers, fiscal ones in particular, established 
for them by the federal legislation. The authority to set local taxes is vested in territorial 
branches of the regional administration that have no elected bodies. Budgets of municipalities 
are incorporated in the regional budget in the form of expenditure plans.   
Type III One-tier structure of state power of a RF subject and two-tier structure of 
municipal bodies of power  
The first level of local government includes big cities and raions (i.e. it corresponds to 
the traditional territorial and administrative hierarchy); the second level is represented by 
governments formed on the territory within the jurisdiction of the local government of the first 
level and includes sub-raion cities and lesser settlements or their associations. Local residents 
elect both the first-level and second-level governments. Local governments of the first level 
engage in direct financial relations with the regional authorities. Financial relations between 
localities of the second level and the regional authorities are indirect and go through local 
governments of the first level. Local governments of the first level are responsible, inter alia, for 
the distribution of regional grants to localities of the second level and for splitting the sharing 
rates of shared taxes from the regional budget. In fact, first-level local governments perform 
functions of bodies of state power of the region vis-à-vis local governments of the second level.   
If the second-level municipalities cover the entire territory in the jurisdiction of the first-
level municipality, the latter usually is made responsible for maintenance of social infrastructure 
facilities providing services to the entire population of the area. Local taxes in this case should 
be delineated between the two tiers of local governments; however, the usual practice for a first-
tier government is to set uniform local tax rates for all municipalities within its jurisdiction. If 
second-tier municipalities represent individual inclusions in the territory of the first-tier locality, 
the latter is responsible for the performance of functions of local self-government in the territory 
outside the jurisdiction of second-tier municipalities. Local taxes in this case are imposed by 
local self-governments of both levels.  
At the same time the second-tier municipalities in a number of RF subjects have no 
budgetary rights and are provided at best with expenditure plans from first-tier municipalities. 
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The above forms of local self-government organization can make up different 
combinations in different subjects: e.g. of 295 municipalities of Tyumen Oblast, 4 have been 
formed at the level of large cities, 2  at the level of raions with the rest set up at the level of 
small townships below raions. In Vladimir Oblast, 18 municipalities set up at raion level have a 
two-tier structure with the other 7 municipal entities having a one-tier type of organization. The 
second-tier municipalities in Vladimir Oblast are individual populated areas that have opted for 
local autonomy. However, regional authorities are unwilling to recognize them as full-fledged 
participants in intergovernmental fiscal relations1 and delegate to the first-tier bodies of local 
self-government the authority to regulate their fiscal capacity.  
At present, there are about 29,500 local administrations in Russia, of which 12,2612 are 
officially registered as municipal entities with only 11,691 having elected representative 
authorities3, only 11,209 municipalities are endowed with municipal property and only 4,400 
have fully independent budget.4 
                                                 
1 In other words, they dont set shares of regulating taxes for them nor do they directly distribute transfers 
to them. 
2  Formation of Local Self-government in the Russian Federation, Goskomstat, September 2000 (in 
Russian). 
3 For instance, in the Ingush Republic heads of municipalities have been appointed by decrees of the 
Republican President. 
4 The information was obtained by the Fiscal Policy Center through a survey of regional financial 
authorities.  
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Table 1.  Types of Public Government in RF Subjects  
Type I a One-tier structure of state power of a RF subject and one-tier structure of 
municipal bodies of power (at the level of large cities and raions) 
 
№ Region 
Number of 
municipal budgets 
and municipalities 
№ Region 
Number of 
municipal budgets 
and municipalities 
1 Aginsk-Buryat АО 39 27 Ingush Republic 6 
2 Arkhangelsk Oblast 26 28 Republic of Karelia 19 
3 Belgorod Oblast 22 29 Republic of Komi 21 
4 Volgograd Oblast 39 30 Republic of Mari El 17 
5 Vologda Oblast 28 31 Rostov Oblast 55 
6 Jewish АО 6 32 Ryazan Oblast 29 
7 Ivanovo Oblast 27 33 Samara Oblast 37 
8 Irkutsk Oblast 37 34 Saratov Oblast 41 
9 Kaliningrad Oblast 22 35 Sakhalin Oblast 19 
10 Kaluga Oblast 45 36 Sverdlovsk Oblast 72 
11 Kamchatka Oblast 9 37 Smolensk Oblast 27 
12 Kemerovo Oblast 35 38 Taimyr АО 4 
13 Kirov Oblast 45 39 Tver Oblast 43 
14 Komi-Perm АО 7 40 Tomsk Oblast 20 
15 Kostroma Oblast 30 41 Tula Oblast 26 
16 Krasnodar Krai 48 42 Udmurt Republic 31 
17 Leningrad Oblast 29 43 Ulianovsk Obalst 24 
18 Murmansk Oblast 24 44 Ust-Orda Buryat АО 6 
19 Nenets АО 21 45 Khanty-Mansi АО 22 
20 Novgorod Oblast 22 46 Chita Oblast 34 
21 Omsk Oblast 33 47 Chuvash Republic 26 
22 Perm Oblast 41 48 Chukotka АО 9 
23 Primorsky Krai 34 49 Evenk АО 3 
24 Republic of Altai 11 50 Yamal-Nenents АО 13 
25 Republic of Buryatia 23 51 Yaroslavl Oblast 19 
26 Republic of Dagestan 52    
 
Type I b One-tier structure of state power of a RF subject and one-tier structure of 
municipal bodies of power (at sub-raion level)  
 
№ Region 
Number of 
municipal budgets 
and municipalities 
1 Orenburg Oblast 579 
2 Penza Oblast 406 
3 Tyumen Oblast 295 
4 Stavropol Krai 304 
Type II Two-tier structure of state power of a RF subject and one-tier structure of 
municipal bodies of power  
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№ Region 
Number of 
territorial state 
budgets at local level  
Number of municipal 
budgets Number of 
municipalities 
1 Kabarda-Balkar Republic 10 5 136 
2 Karachai-Circassian Republic 10 4 85 
3 Kurgan Oblast 26 2 459 
4 Kursk Oblast 33 5 510 
5 Novosibirsk Oblast 45 5 454 
6 Republic of Adygeya 8 2 55 
7 Republic of Bashkortostan 64 5 983 
8 Republic of Kalmykia 14 3 116 
9 Republic of Tatarstan 48 7 934 
10 Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 35 2 2 
11 Republic of Tyva 19 1 1 
12 Republic of Khakassia ? 51 96 
 
 
 
Type III One-tier structure of state power of a RF subject and two-tier structure of 
municipal bodies of power  
 
Number of municipal budgets № 
Region 
First level  Second level  
Number of 
municipalities  
1 Astrakhan Oblast* 13 141 154 
2 Bryansk Oblast 31 43 74 
3 Vladimir Oblast 26 48 74 
4 Moscow Oblast 69 7 76 
5 Republic of Mordovia* 25 444 469 
6 Pskov Oblast 26 2 28 
7 Republic of North Osetia 9 4 114 
8 Chelyabinsk Oblast 39 15 325 
9 Altai Krai  71 0 766 
10 Amur Oblast 28 0 340 
11 Voronezh Oblast 34 0 547 
12 Koryak АО 5 0 33 
13 Krasnoyarsk Oblast 57 0 574 
14 Lipetsk Oblast 20 0 324 
15 Magadan Oblast 9 0 64 
16 Nizhni Novgorod Oblast 52 0 597 
17 Oryol Oblast 27 0 267 
18 Tambov Oblast 30 0 352 
19 Khabarovsk Krai 19 0 224 
 
* Second-level municipalities cover the entire territory in the jurisdiction of the first-level municipality.  
Source: Number of Municipal Budgets - a survey of financial authorities of RF subjects conducted by the experts of 
the Fiscal Policy Center.  
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Therefore, the actual structure of public government in the Russian Federation has four 
levels while the budget and tax legislation covers only three levels of the budgetary system. As a 
consequence, the system of public finance is not efficient. The federal legislation envisages tax 
and expenditure responsibilities for a single local government; as a result, large cities (such as 
capitals of RF subjects), raions that include a great number of small towns and settlements as 
well as rural settlements, provided they are registered as municipalities, have the same 
responsibilities.  
The amounts of revenue received by municipalities from those taxes that are assigned to 
them by the current federal legislation are not enough to cover their expenditure responsibilities.   
Thus, only 13 percent of expenditure needs of an average statistical municipality were covered 
in 1999 by local tax revenues. The share will become even less following the annulment of a 
number of local taxes and fees by the RF Tax Code. At the same time the budget legislation 
assigns significant expenditure responsibilities to municipalities, including those in connection 
with education and healthcare that are guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the expenditure 
responsibilities of sub-raion municipalities do not correspond to their status. At the same time, 
revenue sources of large cities and raions do not meet the expenditure responsibilities assigned 
to them.  
The problem is aggravated by those norms of the federal legislation that allow formation 
of local self-governments within any territorial boundaries. The practice when sub-raion 
municipalities are formed spontaneously or in accordance with political biases of regional 
authorities leads to the following negative consequences:  
 the size of a territory within the jurisdiction of a municipality (and, consequently, the 
coverage by public services) does not correspond to the expenditure and functional 
responsibilities of the local self-government assigned to it by legislation;  
 the fragmented and unevenly distributed revenue base of local governments does not 
conform to the territorial distribution of needs in public services; 
 the managerial staff of local governments does not cope with the assigned responsibilities; 
- as a consequence, local governments and population seek for support from outside. 
 
Expenditure Responsibilities of Local Governments 
In view of the absence of a clear assignment of expenditure responsibilities between the 
regional and local governments, disputes often arise as to what budget is responsible for a 
particular expenditure item and where its financing should come from. Such unclear assignment 
of expenditure responsibilities together with great expenditure norms that are enacted by 
superior governments (federal and regional mandates) result in a situation when local 
governments perform functions of territorial branches of their regional government rather than 
render quality public services to population in their jurisdictions while local budgets are 
transformed into transit accounts. When expenditure responsibilities are assigned, little attention 
is paid to the dependence of public service effectiveness on the level of budget from which the 
costs of these services are covered, no distinction is made between such functions as setting 
standards of public service supply, financing and actual service rendering. Accordingly, there is 
neither clear delineation among these functions nor assignment to the relevant tiers of 
government.  
 
In practice, assignment of expenditure responsibilities very often comes to assignment of 
property since it is not the rights and responsibilities associated with service rendering that are 
delineated but the responsibility for maintenance of social infrastructure facilities.   
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Functional Structure of Local Government Expenditures  
The largest spending functions of local budgets are Housing and Utilities, Education and 
Healthcare (Table 8).   
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Table 8. Composition of local expenditures by function (percent), 1998 and 1999 
  
1998 1999 
By type of budget: 
Budget Classification Item 
(Function) 
Cities Raions Towns Townships  Rural settlements  
Share of 
function in 
aggregate 
subregional 
spending 
Share of 
function in 
total 
subregional 
spending* 
Local government 3.9 7.3 4.6 6.8 12.1 5.3 5.7 
Law enforcement, public order 1.6 1.2 1.6 0.5 0.2 1.4 1.6 
Industry, energy, construction 0.8 5.4 0.5 0.4 1.1 2.1 1.4 
Agriculture and fishing 1.4 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.2 1.4 1.8 
Public transport, roads, 
telecommunications  
4.9 1.2 1.2 0.4 0.1 3.5 3.1 
Housing and utilities 34.6 23.8 37.8 28.0 10.4 30.3 27.4 
Education 24.6 29.3 36.5 45.4 56.6 28.1 28.1 
Culture, art and cinema 1.6 3.0 1.5 2.5 8.1 2.3 2.5 
Healthcare and physical fitness 15.8 14.8 10.9 9.9 8.8 15.0 15.8 
Welfare 5.4 7.6 3.2 1.7 1.7 5.7 5.5 
Other expenditures 5.4 4.6 1.9 4.0 0.7 4.9 4.3 
Total expenditures without budget 
loans  
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*  Only aggregated data for all local governments are available for 1999. 
Source: authors calculations based on RF Ministry of Finance data.  
 
Such heavy spending on housing and utilities is due to subsidized housing rents and 
utility charges. Since housing and utility subsidies only apply to municipal housing, they are a 
big spending category only in large cities, whereas in rural areas where the majority of houses 
are in private ownership the share of housing and utilities in total local spending is much lower.  
For rural municipalities the largest spending function (accounting for more than half of 
all budget resources) is education.  
Rural municipalities spend less on healthcare than other localities, as hospitals are for the 
most part located in cities  raion or regional centers, while rural localities mostly provide 
paramedic and obstetrical services.  
Table 9 gives some idea of the degree of basic public services decentralization in the 
Russian regions. Let us note that the share of local budgets in consolidated regional healthcare 
spending is noticeably below the national average in regions with heavy fragmentation of local 
government. This is explained by the fact that hospital maintenance accounts for the largest 
portion of healthcare spending while hospital allocation to municipalities is extremely uneven 
owing to the latters fragmentation. In such situation regional governments have to pay hospital 
maintenance costs from their budgets. On the contrary, schools and social centers are distributed 
in a more even manner and therefore in their case the above pattern is less noticeable. Thus, 
following the reorganization of local self-government structure in Tyumen Oblast when 
municipalities were set up according to the below-raion principle, the regional budget had to 
include in its balance-sheet most public institutions in raions. As a result, the local government 
share in the Oblast consolidated spending fell from 60 to 45 percent and the decentralization 
campaign announce by the Oblast governor turned into its very opposite.  
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Table 9. Degree of Decentralization of Basic Public Services: Regional and Local Spending Shares by 
Functions, 1999  
HOUSING AND 
UTILITIES EDUCATION CULTURE AND ART 
HEALTHCARE AND 
FITNESS 
Region 
% of region 
% of 
munici-
palities 
% of region
% of 
munici-
palities 
%  of region
% of 
munici-
palities 
% of region % of munici-palities 
Russian Federation 26.3 73.7 24.1 75.9 43.3 56.7 42.4 57.6
North    
Republic of Karelia 14.9 85.1 17.8 82.2 49.8 50.2 39.5 60.5
Republic of Komi 3.4 96.6 10.1 89.9 26.3 73.7 66.1 33.9
Archangelsk Oblast 7.5 92.5 8.1 91.9 28.9 71.1 35.7 64.3
Vologda Oblast 3.5 96.5 24.0 76.0 41.7 58.3 37.8 62.2
Murmansk Oblast 1.4 98.6 5.1 94.9 28.4 71.6 30.0 70.0
Nenets Ao 34.2 65.8 41.7 58.3 49.0 51.0 82.1 17.9
North West    
City of St.-Petersburg 97.9 2.1 99.4 0.6 99.0 1.0 99.4 0.6
Leningrad Oblast 2.1 97.9 11.5 88.5 30.4 69.6 47.3 52.7
Novgorod Oblast 14.5 85.5 9.9 90.1 16.2 83.8 50.9 49.1
Pskov Oblast 15.6 84.4 18.1 81.9 42.7 57.3 40.1 59.9
Center    
Bryansk Oblast 8.4 91.6 9.8 90.2 28.5 71.5 44.7 55.3
Vladimir  Oblast 1.3 98.7 4.3 95.7 19.1 80.9 25.0 75.0
Ivanovo Oblast 0.6 99.4 8.1 91.9 31.2 68.8 26.7 73.3
Tver Oblast 2.3 97.7 9.3 90.7 31.2 68.8 39.8 60.2
Kaluga Oblast 4.9 95.1 18.8 81.2 40.6 59.4 32.4 67.6
Kostroma Oblast 21.0 79.0 11.4 88.6 30.4 69.6 30.8 69.2
Moscow Oblast 5.5 94.5 11.9 88.1 14.9 85.1 19.0 81.0
Oryol Oblast 49.6 50.4 20.7 79.3 37.2 62.8 36.2 63.8
Ryazan Oblast 15.8 84.2 13.4 86.6 30.1 69.9 41.1 58.9
Smolensk Oblast 7.1 92.9 16.9 83.1 32.4 67.6 23.4 76.6
Tula Oblast 5.1 94.9 8.3 91.7 26.4 73.6 24.0 76.0
Volga-Vyatka    
Yaroslavl Oblast 2.2 97.8 12.4 87.6 31.8 68.2 26.6 73.4
Republic of Mari El 7.9 92.1 25.0 75.0 40.4 59.6 30.9 69.1
Republic of Mordovia 22.7 77.3 15.7 84.3 39.8 60.2 32.4 67.6
Chuvash Republic 9.3 90.7 10.0 90.0 34.8 65.2 21.9 78.1
Nizhny Novgorod Republic 3.3 96.7 14.1 85.9 18.1 81.9 10.4 89.6
Kirov Oblast 7.4 92.6 7.0 93.0 20.5 79.5 28.0 72.0
Central Black Earth    
Belgorod Oblast 14.3 85.7 19.5 80.5 31.2 68.8 38.9 61.1
Voronezh Oblast 7.3 92.7 10.9 89.1 22.8 77.2 27.3 72.7
Kursk Oblast 10.3 89.7 12.6 87.4 63.6 36.4 43.4 56.6
Lipetsk Oblast 2.5 97.5 9.3 90.7 29.0 71.0 33.7 66.3
Tambov Oblast 1.3 98.7 9.6 90.4 28.2 71.8 40.2 59.8
Volga River Basin    
Republic of Kalmykia 50.2 49.8 10.6 89.4 33.1 66.9 77.2 22.8
Republic of Tatarstan 13.9 86.1 9.2 90.8 44.3 55.7 28.2 71.8
Astrakhan Oblast 10.2 89.8 18.2 81.8 45.1 54.9 34.4 65.6
Volgograd Oblast 6.0 94.0 13.5 86.5 30.8 69.2 16.8 83.2
Samara Oblast 3.3 96.7 40.6 59.4 28.8 71.2 75.9 24.1
Penza Oblast 16.2 83.8 44.1 55.9 56.9 43.1 55.7 44.3
Saratov Oblast 5.6 94.4 14.9 85.1 38.2 61.8 29.7 70.3
Ulianovsk Oblast 20.4 79.6 26.3 73.7 55.0 45.0 50.5 49.5
North Caucauses    
Republic of Dagestan 21.7 78.3 14.9 85.1 35.1 64.9 81.0 19.0
Kabarda-Balkar Republic 53.5 46.5 24.7 75.3 40.8 59.2 40.6 59.4
Republic of North Osetia 11.9 88.1 19.8 80.2 72.9 27.1 54.3 45.7
Ingush republic 87.9 12.1 46.6 53.4 56.4 43.6 68.3 31.7
Krasnodar Krai 11.0 89.0 7.9 92.1 23.3 76.7 23.2 76.8
Stavropol Krai 35.6 64.4 15.3 84.7 23.1 76.9 24.3 75.7
Rostov Oblast 2.3 97.7 8.3 91.7 62.9 37.1 34.5 65.5
Republic of Adygeya 11.9 88.1 28.6 71.4 51.8 48.2 42.6 57.4
Karachai-Circassian Republic 34.1 65.9 10.5 89.5 31.2 68.8 41.5 58.5
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HOUSING AND 
UTILITIES EDUCATION CULTURE AND ART 
HEALTHCARE AND 
FITNESS 
Region % of region % of 
munici-
palities 
% of region % of 
munici-
palities 
%  of region % of 
munici-
palities 
% of region % of munici-
palities 
Urals    
Republic of Bashkortostan 50.4 49.6 26.2 73.8 58.8 41.2 38.0 62.0
Udmurt Republic 9.0 91.0 9.7 90.3 22.9 77.1 28.1 71.9
Kurgan Oblast 5.1 94.9 17.1 82.9 23.5 76.5 34.1 65.9
Orenburg Oblast 37.7 62.3 45.0 55.0 60.4 39.6 56.2 43.8
Perm Oblast 2.6 97.4 9.6 90.4 29.1 70.9 26.1 73.9
Sverdlovsk Oblast 2.0 98.0 19.0 81.0 29.6 70.4 44.6 55.4
Chelyabinsk Oblast 5.2 94.8 12.8 87.2 29.2 70.8 16.8 83.2
Komi-Perm AO 8.3 91.7 11.1 88.9 27.8 72.2 45.7 54.3
West Siberia    
Altai Krai 5.9 94.1 8.9 91.1 26.1 73.9 21.7 78.3
Kemerovo Oblast 2.3 97.7 11.9 88.1 17.0 83.0 18.3 81.7
Novosibirsk Oblast 0.0 100.0 6.9 93.1 49.8 50.2 27.0 73.0
Omsk Oblast 32.9 67.1 42.1 57.9 61.1 38.9 46.3 53.7
Tomsk Oblast 3.9 96.1 19.5 80.5 30.9 69.1 39.5 60.5
Tyumen Oblast 19.3 80.7 19.9 80.1 50.7 49.3 62.1 37.9
Republic of Altai 30.3 69.7 21.8 78.2 24.0 76.0 55.7 44.3
Khanty-Mansi АО 12.1 87.9 9.5 90.5 8.6 91.4 14.2 85.8
Yamal-Nenets АО 1.5 98.5 13.8 86.2 21.8 78.2 34.6 65.4
East Siberia    
Republic of Buryatia 3.9 96.1 9.0 91.0 39.3 60.7 37.7 62.3
Republic of Tyva 13.9 86.1 11.6 88.4 33.7 66.3 46.1 53.9
Krasnoyarsk Krai 5.3 94.7 8.3 91.7 25.6 74.4 17.1 82.9
Irkutsk Oblast 3.4 96.6 6.5 93.5 63.6 36.4 19.0 81.0
Chita Oblast 3.9 96.1 17.1 82.9 37.7 62.3 44.1 55.9
Republic of Khakassia 10.8 89.2 13.2 86.8 26.5 73.5 29.7 70.3
Aginsk-Buryat  АО 17.2 82.8 12.7 87.3 67.4 32.6 90.2 9.8
Taimyr АО 77.1 22.9 16.2 83.8 20.2 79.8 78.2 21.8
Ust-Orda Buryat АО 66.4 33.6 7.9 92.1 14.6 85.4 38.4 61.6
Evenk  АО 6.3 93.7 27.4 72.6 50.7 49.3 60.4 39.6
Far East 
   
Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 9.4 90.6 23.5 76.5 49.7 50.3 42.5 57.5
Primorsky Krai 1.4 98.6 11.3 88.7 18.4 81.6 36.2 63.8
Khabarovsk Krai 25.5 74.5 8.4 91.6 32.6 67.4 33.8 66.2
Amur Oblast 0.0 100.0 23.3 76.7 14.0 86.0 32.9 67.1
Kamchatka Oblast 4.5 95.5 11.4 88.6 27.8 72.2 26.1 73.9
Magadan Oblast 6.2 93.8 8.9 91.1 36.4 63.6 38.6 61.4
Sakhalin Oblast 5.4 94.6 6.4 93.6 38.0 62.0 25.0 75.0
Jewish АО 9.7 90.3 11.8 88.2 17.5 82.5 76.6 23.4
Koryak АО 8.6 91.4 15.9 84.1 25.6 74.4 18.7 81.3
Chukotka АО 7.4 92.6 7.6 92.4 17.4 82.6 37.1 62.9
Kaliningrad Oblast 4.8 95.2 5.7 94.3 36.9 63.1 31.6 68.4
Source: authors calculations based on RF Ministry of Finance data.  
 
Expenditure Norms 
Unlike in many other countries, Russian legislation, in particular the Budget Code, 
contains references to federal expenditure norms (social standards) that must be observed by all 
levels of government while forming their budgets. But the system of such norms has not been 
approved nor even developed yet. Although the Russian Ministry of Economy and sector 
ministries have not given up their attempts to develop such a system, common sense suggests 
that it is hardly possible to develop a uniform system of expenditure norms for as big a country 
as Russia. Actually, only a few expenditure norms have so far been established at the federal 
level, and but for a few exceptions they are not mandatory spending standards, but reference 
standards used by higher level government for determining the allocation of fiscal capacity 
equalization transfers to localities.  
At present the only effective norm set at the federal level under the Russian Government 
Decree is the Uniform Schedule of Wages for Workers of Budget Organizations. Workers of 
budget organizations are employees of all institutions funded from the budget of any level, 
including the local one, except for the administrative staff of governments.  
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Federal Mandates 
The spending autonomy of local authorities is narrowly constrained by federal laws that 
entitle various population groups to benefits and subsidies, in other words, by the so-called 
federal mandates. 
Benefits and subsidies to eligible population groups are prescribed in more than 150 
federal legislative acts, of which 45 were passed before 1992, but still remain in effect. Local 
authorities are mandated to pay 37 types of subsidies from local budgets, with eligible groups 
covering a sizable portion of local citizenry, if not the entire population.  
Responsibility for most of those entitlements and subsidies have been from the outset 
assigned by federal laws to local governments. Funding requirements of federal mandates, if 
they are all followed, are estimated to outrun all revenues, including transfers, of most localities. 
For instance, according to the estimates made by the officials of Kirovsky Raion, Leningrad 
Oblast, the funds needed to finance the mandates would more than exhaust all budget revenues 
available to the municipality. Reported budget revenues in 1997 were 16 percent less than the 
total estimated cost of federal mandates. 
The Federal Law On Financial Foundations of Local Self-government in the Russian 
Federation (1997) provides that bodies of local self-government shall be entitled to execute 
decisions of bodies of state power resulting in increase of expenditures or loss of revenues of 
local budgets within resources made available to them by way of compensation. However, in 
the overwhelming majority of cases local authorities fail to prove inadequacy of funds 
transferred to them by way of compensation because, strictly speaking, this can be proven 
only where funds are transferred for particular purposes. In practice the amount of funds 
required for compensation is just taken into account in establishing rates of shared taxes or in 
determining total transfer amounts. Meanwhile, local authorities are sued by individuals for 
failure to pay the entitlements and often lose such court cases.  
Examples of federal mandates include: 
- wages of teachers, doctors, and certain other categories of budget employees 
- payment of monthly child allowances 
- subsidies relating to payment for housing, utilities, electricity, and fuel 
- subsidies for fuel purchases by disabled persons 
- monthly cash compensation to teachers for the cost of book purchases 
- provision of free medicine to certain population groups 
- payment of allowances to persons having custody over children 
- free meals in schools and hospitals 
- free milk products for children under 2 years of age 
- free prosthesis for disabled persons 
- burial subsidies 
- subsidies for payment for telecommunication, municipal transport and certain other services 
for WWII veterans, old-age pensioners, families of WWII victims, victims of the Chernobyl 
disaster, families with many children, Heroes of the Soviet Union and Heroes of the Socialist 
Labor Movement, blood donors, military servicemen, police officers, customs officers, 
prosecutors office workers, court officers, tax police officers and traffic police officers. 
 
The Law on 2001 Federal Budget provides for setting up of a so-called Compensation 
Fund within the Fund for Financial Support of Regions from which regions will receive 
resources to cover (in part or in full) their expenditures associated with execution of federal laws 
on monthly payment of child and invalid allowances. However, by no means all the regions  
finance these allowances from their budgets. Thus, in most of them child allowances are 
provided from local budgets without any compensation from the relevant regional budget. 
Instead, local needs in expenditures on child allowances are taken into account when financial 
assistance is distributed from the regional government. Nevertheless, since financial resources 
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from the Compensation Fund will be provided to regions in form of earmarked subventions the 
RF Ministry of Finance will be able to monitor their purposeful use, e.g. they will either be 
allocated to local budgets as earmarked subventions or paid directly from regional budgets. In 
both cases the burden of local budgets will become lighter. 
 
Revenue Sources of Local Budgets  
The process of local self-government formation in the Russian Federation was not 
accompanied by provision of greater authority to regulate fiscal capacity at the local 
governments own discretion. At the same time, in most regions municipalities account for a 
considerable share of consolidated spending (see Table 2). Since local tax and non-tax revenue 
represent but an insignificant part in municipal expenditures, the vertical imbalance thus arising 
has to be covered by sharing rates of shared taxes and financial assistance that local 
governments receive from the regional budget (Table 3). Some 24 percent of local expenditures 
in 1999 were covered from regional resources (transfers, grants, subventions and mutual 
settlements). If we add to this tax sharing resources (at rates changed on the annual basis) and 
financial assistance from the higher governments, the figure will be 68 percent. Because sharing 
rates change from year to year, local governments  cannot forecast their budget  revenues and 
actually have no responsibility for formulation and execution  of their budgets and, in the final 
analysis, for the quality and quantity of public services rendered to population.  
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Table 2. Distribution of RF Consolidated Budget Expenditures among Levels of Budgetary 
System, 1999  
Year 
Consolidated budget 
expenditures, 
percentage of GDP 
Federal budget 
percentage share of RF 
consolidated budget  
Regional budgets 
percentage share of RF 
consolidated budget  
Local budgets percentage 
share of RF consolidated 
budget  
1997 32.5 44.6 23.8 31.7 
1998 27.9 45.9 24.2 29.8 
1999 27.7 48.0 24.5 27.5 
Source: authors calculations based on RF Ministry of Finance data.  
 
Table 3. Structure of Local Budgets Revenues  in the Russian Federation, 1999 
 Revenue sources Bln. Rbl. % 
 Total local budgets revenues  (1+2+3+4) 346.3 100.0
 of which:  
1. Tax revenues 245.9 71.1
1.1     - local tax revenues  45.5 13.1
1.2   - revenues permanently assigned to municipalities by the 
federal legislation  
47.4 13.7
1.3     - sharing taxes 153.0 44.2
2. Non-tax revenues 12.4 3.6
3. Earmarked budgetary funds revenues 4.0 1.2
4. Grants from higher governments 84.0 24.3
4.1     - grants and transfers 54.2 15.7
4.2     - subventions 9.4 2.7
4.3     - other 20.4 5.9
Source: authors calculations based on RF Ministry of Finance data.  
 
Local Taxes and Fees 
Before 1998, when regions were authorized to introduce sales tax that replaced the 
majority of local taxes, most Russian regions levied 23 local taxes (see Table 7). Revenues from 
those levies in 1999 amounted to 13 percent of all revenues for municipalities. 
With their rates virtually legislated by the federal government, local taxes, despite being 
numerous, failed to ensure fiscal autonomy for localities. Furthermore, the list of local taxes was 
exhaustive, i.e. no new taxes could be added by localities at their own discretion. Local 
governments could exercise some autonomy in setting the base and rates for a very limited 
number of taxes, such as the tax on construction of manufacturing facilities in health resort 
areas, fee for the right to engage in trade, fee for parking motor vehicles, racecourse 
participation fee, fee for the right to shoot movies and TV films, fee for street cleaning, and fee 
for setting up gambling businesses.  
The fee for street cleaning levied on gross sales of enterprises had become a significant 
source of own budget revenue for a number of localities. In some cases revenues from the tax 
amounted to 25 percent of all tax collections, and, clearly, it was spent not only on street 
cleaning. In 2001 the Russian Government is planning to repeal all turnover taxes, including this 
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one, and compensate for resulting revenue losses by assigning to municipalities 5 percent of 
collections from the enterprise profits tax. 
The regional sales tax replaces 16 local taxes, including those with respect to which 
localities exercised at least limited freedom in setting the tax base and tax rates. Instead, local 
governments are assigned 60 percent of sales tax collections that, as the practice shows, often 
fail to compensate for the loss of revenue from repealed local taxes.  
Article 15 of the Russian Federation Tax Code that determines the list of local taxes and 
fees has not been yet put into effect. However, it is suggestive of federal legislators intentions 
vis-à-vis local taxes. Thus, a list of local taxes contained therein includes only 5 taxes:  
− land tax,  
− personal property tax,  
− inheritance and gift tax,  
− advertisement tax,  
− local license fees. 
The said Article establishes that once a subject of the Federation puts into effect the 
Immovable Property Tax, the Land Tax and Personal Property Tax will cease to be levied for 
local governments in its jurisdiction. 
Non-tax Revenues  
The main sources of local non-tax revenues are: 
− revenues from use of municipal property and activities, 
− revenues from sales of municipal land and immovable property. 
These revenues are an independent source of local budget revenues. Starting from 1999, 
the budget classification treats revenues from sales of public property as a source of deficit 
financing, because these revenue sources are not recurrent.  
In addition to local tax and non-tax revenues mentioned above, the law On Financial 
Foundations of Local Self-government in the Russian Federation allows local governments to 
collect «lump-sum voluntary contributions from citizens in accordance with the municipal 
charter», or «self-imposed charges». The budget classification, however, does not allow to 
recognize these charges in total revenues. If municipalities collect these charges, the latter are 
probably used as a revenue source for forming extra-budgetary funds, rather than as a source of 
budget revenues. 
Federal and Regional Tax Revenues Permanently Assigned to Local Budgets 
Tax revenue assigned to localities on a permanent basis under the Federal Law On 
Foundations of the Tax System in the Russian Federation include: 
• federal tax revenue from: 
− royalty (a fixed share set for each type of payment for subsoil resources), 
− stamp duty (100%), 
− state duty (100%), 
− inheritance and gift tax (100%), 
− income tax on persons engaged in individual entrepreneurial activities (100%), 
• regional tax revenues from: 
− enterprise property tax (50%), 
− sales tax (60%). 
Assigned tax revenues in 1999 amounted to 13.7 percent of all revenue for localities. 
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Shared Taxes at Rates Changed Annually 
Shared taxes are a principal tool of intergovernmental fiscal regulation at the regional 
level and account for the largest amount of revenues distributed from regional budgets to 
localities.  
Local revenues from shared taxes are general purpose grants extended from a higher 
level budget on a gratuitous basis, just like subsidies or equalization transfers. Sharing rates for 
taxes that are shared between the region and localities and a list of taxes that regions use for 
regulating fiscal capacity of municipalities in their jurisdictions are set by regional governments.  
Taxes that regions can choose to share with localities include: 
• the following federal taxes that the federation shares with the regions: 
- personal income tax, 
- enterprise profits tax, 
- excises assigned on share by the federal authorities to subjects of the Russian Federation; 
• the following regional taxes: 
- enterprise property tax (within 50-percent share assigned to the regional level), 
- forest tax,  
- payment for water,  
- education tax,  
- sales tax (within 40-percent share assigned to the regional level). 
Under the Law On Financial Foundations, the region can set different sharing rates of 
federal taxes for different municipalities, but the share of all localities in total collections from a 
particular federal tax that the region is allowed to retain in consolidated regional budget should 
not be less than a certain minimum which varies by type of tax: 
- 50 percent for the personal income tax, 
- 5 percent (of total collections) of the enterprise profits tax,5 
- 10 percent for VAT,6 
- 5 percent for excises on alcoholic beverages, 
- 10 percent for excises on other goods. 
However, the above minimum requirements provide no guidelines to municipalities for 
estimating their next year revenues from tax sharing, as the average sharing requirement can be 
met with a wide range of local sharing rate combinations, including the ones where some 
municipalities are allowed to retain 100% of shared taxes collected in their territories, and some 
are assigned 0 sharing rates.  
The Law On Financial Foundations requires that local sharing rates be formula-driven 
and that shared taxes and equalization transfers be allocated to municipalities using a uniform 
methodology. These requirements imply that both regional/local tax sharing and equalization 
transfers to localities from the regional government are both general purpose regional grants, but 
transferred to localities through different channels. In practice, however, these requirements are 
not enforced, and regional authorities make no attempts to allocate those funds using a single 
equalization methodology. 
Earmarked and General Purpose Grants 
Grants to localities from the federal and regional budgets include equalization transfers 
(subsidies), subventions and mutual settlements. 
Equalization transfers are distributed to localities for the sole purpose of fiscal capacity 
equalization, meaning that local governments are free to spend these revenues at their own 
discretion. Revenue sources of the equalization fund within the regional budget and the size 
thereof are determined by regional governments.  
                                                 
5 Starting from 2001,  a local 5 percent enterprise profits tax will be collected. 
6 Starting from 2001, all VAT revenues will be consolidated in the federal budget. 
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Under the Law On Financial Foundations, equalization transfers should be allocated 
across municipalities using a fixed formula, the parameters of which include the population size, 
the share of various age groups, such as pre-school and school age children as well as of 
pension-age individuals, in total population of a municipality, the level of per capita fiscal 
capacity before equalization and other local features. In practice in the majority of regions the 
distribution of equalization transfers is negotiated rather than formula-driven.  
Subventions mean financial resources allocated for designated purposes for a certain 
period of time to municipalities from the federal or regional budget and subject to repayment to 
an appropriate budget in case of failure to use the same for the intended purpose within the 
established time-limit. The federal legislation sets neither the purpose for which regions should 
provide subventions to localities nor the procedure for regions to follow in distributing 
subventions among localities.  
Regions rarely use subventions as a channel for transfer of financial resources to 
localities as this would immediately reveal inadequacy of amounts transferred. Instead, they try 
to get out of it with lame excuses that funds for execution of federal and regional mandates were 
taken into account in determining the size of equalizing transfers distributed to local budgets. 
When they are used, subventions from regional budgets are provided primarily for the execution 
of federal mandates,7 and sometimes for the executions of regional mandates.8 
Another type of earmarked grants is mutual settlements. Mutual settlements are funds 
transferred by regional governments to localities to reimburse the latter for their cost increases 
or revenue losses brought about by decisions of the regional government made during the budget 
year, i.e. after local budgets were approved. Under the category of mutual settlements local 
budgets mostly receive funds for covering costs of maintenance of housing, utilities and other 
facilities transferred to municipalities. Besides, under this category localities may receive 
additional earmarked assistance (not provided for in the budget) for financing other types of 
spending as well as for writing off debts on budget loans. There is no prescribed method of 
allocating those additional financial resources across municipalities.  
Methods of Intergovernmental Grant Allocation  
Different regions use different approaches to allocating intergovernmental transfers to 
localities.  
Most regions estimate expenditure needs and revenue capacity of localities and allocate 
transfers to cover the financing gap. These numbers are then negotiated between the region and 
individual localities: localities would present different figures to claim expenditure needs that 
are higher and anticipated revenue collections that are lower than regional estimates. In so doing 
both parties usually refer to historic tax collections and expenditures or estimates derived from 
previous years' data. As a rule, financial assistance is distributed to municipalities on the basis of 
the number of social infrastructure facilities in their jurisdiction. That is why local authorities are 
interested in maintenance of ineffective facilities, which has a negative impact on budget 
spending efficiency. 
The lack of real revenue raising and spending autonomy weakens local governments 
responsibility before their electorates and gives them an opportunity to blame higher 
governments for insufficient financing or laws that cannot be complied with. Soft restrains and 
the possibility to obtain additional funds from higher governments, provided local authorities 
persuade them to take into account their additional expenditure needs, makes ineffective 
                                                 
7 In Vladimir Oblast subventions from the Oblast budget in 1999 were provided first and foremost for 
payment of child allowances to low-income families, while in Leningrad Oblast  for payment of 
subsidies to eligible groups for housing and utilities and free medicines. 
8 In 1999, subventions in Leningrad Oblast to local budgets were used to support the State Service of 
Medical and Social Examination. In Altai Krai local budgets received subventions for maintenace of 
inter-raion budget agencies. 
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management of financial resources rather profitable for municipalities. Large wage arrears or 
accounts payable become an additional argument for allocation of financial assistance. 
This approach obviously discourages local tax efforts and prudent spending of local 
resources. Moreover, it creates incentives for local authorities to hide revenues in extra-
budgetary funds to avoid reporting, and negotiate in-kind offsets with potential taxpayers to 
boost spending. Soft budget constraints permit local authorities to keep inefficient public 
facilities, overstaffed budget organizations and use inefficient technologies of public service 
provision.  
Another problem has to do with the use of regional expenditure norms for the estimation 
of local expenditure needs by the regions for allocating equalization transfers. Several regions, 
including the Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and Moscow Oblasts, have established them in their laws. 
Rather than being standards for provision of public services to consumers, those norms are 
maintenance standards for service providing institutions. For instance, these are not financing 
norms per student, but expenditure norms per school that are applied regardless of whether a 
particular school is at all needed. Besides, expenditure norms are demand driven and disregard 
the actual affordability of norm-driven expenditures. The expenditure needs based on norms 
often exceed the available resources, hence regions eventually have to cut down expenditures 
borne out of a lengthy and labor-intensive calculation procedure. The failure to comply with 
norms that were fixed as laws also creates social tensions.  
Some of the regions have attempted to develop formal methodologies for distribution of 
financial resources that instead of using historic data on previous years' actual expenditures and 
revenue collections will determine local expenditure needs and revenue potential for the coming 
year on the basis of certain objective criteria. However, unlike the federal government that had 
turned to the use of transparent formulas for transfer allocation in 1994 and since then scored an 
impressive progress in this area, governments of most regions either do not realize the need for 
formalization of intergovernmental fiscal relations or, even if they do, are incapable of solving 
the problem on their own for lack of expertise needed to develop an appropriate methodology.  
In June 2000, the federal Ministry of Finance approved and circulated to financial 
departments of subjects of the Federation a document called Provisional Methodological 
Recommendations for RF Subjects on Regulation of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations 
(hereinafter referred to as Recommendations). The Recommendations were developed by the RF 
Ministry of Finance in cooperation with independent experts9 and based on the experience of 
formalization of intergovernmental fiscal relations in advanced Russian regions (Leningrad 
Oblast, Vladimir Oblast), the international practice of intergovernmental fiscal relations and a 
requirement to apply formal methods in distributing fiscal grants as set out in the Law On 
Financial Foundations.  
The Recommendations advise regional administrations to use the following guidelines 
for allocating grants: 
1. the principle of balancing own revenues and needs of localities should be abandoned in 
favor of a formula-based equalization of per capita fiscal capacity;  
2. instead of past revenue collections, endowment of municipalities with taxable resources 
should be used for estimating their revenue capacity; 
3. in measuring per capita fiscal capacity, consideration should be given to objective 
differences in demand for public services and costs of providing them such as the 
demographics of the population, cost of living, duration of the heating season, population 
density, etc., while estimation of expenditure needs based on the existing social 
infrastructure should be abandoned; 
                                                 
9 The Fiscal Policy Center, Georgia State University and the Fiscal Reform in Russia Project sponsored by 
United States Agency for International Development. 
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4. amounts of shared taxes and equalization transfers to go to municipalities should be 
estimated within a single procedure. 
There can be many ways of formalized distribution of financial assistance based on the 
above principles, and each region is free to choose the one that will suit it best.  
Using a formalized methodology of allocation of financial resources will ensure 
predictability of transfer amounts, save time spent in agreeing local budget targets, create 
incentives for local governments to raise more revenues and for more prudent use of budget 
resources. 
It should be emphasized that under the current federal legislation regional governments 
are free to choose the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations within their boundaries, while 
the federal government may not order but only advise. Nevertheless, many regions have shown 
interest in using new methods and are planning to start using formula-driven allocations already 
in 2001. 
Equalization  Efficiency  
The efficiency with which regions equalize fiscal capacities of their municipalities is 
different and explained not so much by weak methodology but by a specific policy conducted by 
the region in question. Regional governments have to chose between two options: an equal 
access of residents of any municipality to public services and a policy when wealthy regions 
are allowed to retain part of  regional and federal taxes collected in their jurisdictions, which is a 
stimulus for their further development, in contrast to the policy of leveling with its negative 
consequences.  
In order to analyze the equalization efficiency, first per capita municipal own revenue 
capacity was calculated and then the revenue capacity of the same municipalities after tax 
sharing, equalization transfers and other funds of intergovernmental fiscal regulation were 
provided to them. The calculation results for 49 regions are shown in Table 5. The following 
figures provide an idea about the equalization situation: according to the estimation of the RF 
Ministry of Finance,10 in 2001 per capita fiscal capacity adjusted for the Budget Expenditures 
Index in the wealthiest RF subject (Yamal-Nenets AO) will be 45 times more than in the poorest 
region (Evenk AO). It is planned to reduce this gap up to six times after providing FFSR 
transfers to the regions. The degree of inequality of per capita fiscal capacity measured with 
Gini Coefficient was 0.64 before equalization transfers and 0.49 after their provision.11 A 
comparison of these figures with those in Table 5 shows that as far as the ratio of per capita 
fiscal capacity of the wealthiest and poorest regions is concerned, the inequality among 
municipalities in some regions (e.g., in Moscow Oblast and in Khabarovsk Krai) is higher than 
the degree of inequality among the RF regions although, in terms of Gini Coefficient, the 
inequality among municipalities in any region does not reach the inequality among the RF 
regions (the Republic of Dagestan has the highest Gini Coefficient: 0.53). It should be noted that 
all the regions on which data are available are more successful in their equalization efforts vis-à-
vis lower governments than the federal government doing the same with regard to the regions. 
However, this is not surprising since the federal Fund for Financial Support of Regions  
comprises only 11 percent  of the total revenue capacity of the regions (gross tax resources plus 
FFSR) while the total amount of funds received by local governments through the channels of 
intergovernmental fiscal regulation (in form of tax sharing and grants from higher budgets, see 
Table 4) make up about 68 percent of their total incomes.  
 
                                                 
10 The Methodology and results of transfer calculations made by the Fund for Financial Support of Regions 
for 2001.  
11 According to the estimations of the Fiscal Policy Center. Cf. N. Barbasheva, A Comparison of Regional 
Fiscal Capacity Equalization Following FFSR Transfers in 2000 and 2001, www.fpcenter.org.  
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Table 3.  Inequality of Municipal Fiscal Capacity across RF Regions before and after Equalization, 1999 
 Ratio of per capita fiscal capacity of the wealthiest and 
poorest municipalities   
Gini Coefficient before and 
after equalization 
 Before equalization After equalization before after 
1 Republic of Adygeya 3.67 1.42 0.20 0.05 
2 Republic of Mordovia 3.75 2.03 0.24 0.08 
3 Kirov Oblast 3.93 2.75 0.21 0.11 
4 Republic of Mari El 4.51 1.72 0.21 0.09 
5 Komi-Perm АО 4.62 1.62 0.30 0.08 
6 Kabarda-Balkar Republic 4.70 2.54 0.24 0.12 
7 Pskov Oblast 5.34 2.34 0.23 0.15 
8 Vladimir Oblast 5.48 4.76 0.22 0.11 
9 Kurgan Oblast 5.57 1.89 0.28 0.13 
10 Kamchatka Oblast 5.64 6.50 0.1 0.15 
11 Orlov Oblast 5.70 1.46 0.31 0.06 
12 Kaliningrad Oblast 5.94 2.30 0.27 0.15 
13 Bryansk Oblast 6.02 2.09 0.24 0.13 
14 Vologda Oblast 6.38 2.09 0.30 0.14 
15 Kaluga Oblast 6.38 4.28 0.21 0.13 
16 Novgorod Oblast 6.53 1.85 0.31 0.10 
17 Jewish AO 6.56 1.48 0.25 0.05 
18 Altai Krai 6.58 5.60 0.34 0.10 
19 Chuvash Republic 6.80 1.88 0.33 0.08 
20 Ulianovsk Oblast 7.31 2.79 0.28 0.09 
21 Kostroma Oblast 7.37 2.73 0.23 0.11 
22 Republic of Karelia 7.67 3.07 0.25 0.17 
23 Kemerovo Oblast 9.25 3.33 0.31 0.14 
24 Republic of tatarstan 9.47 4.79 0.27 0.16 
25 Karachai-Circassian Republic 9.74 1.47 0.35 0.08 
26 Primorsky Krai 9.84 5.00 0.30 0.19 
27 Omsk Oblast 9.86 2.93 0.30 0.16 
28 Samara Oblast 10.65 2.49 0.27 0.17 
29 Rostov Oblast 10.98 3.02 0.27 0.17 
30 Belgorod Oblast 11.67 2.16 0.31 0.12 
31 Chelyabinsk Obalst 12.54 3.36 0.31 0.17 
32 Arkhangelsk Oblast 13.24 3.66 0.27 0.15 
33 Republic of Khakassia 15.09 2.68 0.45 0.17 
34 Amur Oblast 15.81 4.00 0.32 0.20 
35 Chita Oblast 19.59 5.33 0.30 0.13 
36 Irkutsk Oblast 20.07 2.24 0.30 0.18 
37 Kursk Oblast 20.37 4.37 0.40 0.20 
38 Astrakhan Oblast 21.31 2.32 0.38 0.08 
39 Ivanovo Oblast 21.81 2.73 0.30 0.10 
40 Republic of Buryatia 22.33 3.50 0.37 0.14 
41 Leningrad Oblast 26.75 5.05 0.38 0.16 
42 Republic of Komi 31.84 2.21 0.36 0.13 
43 Republic of Bashkortostan 33.38 2.66 0.25 0.06 
44 Sverdlovsk Oblast 34.76 16.49 0.27 0.12 
45 Khanty-Mansi  АО 35.92 4.58 0.31 0.18 
46 Moscow Oblast 49.93 40.87 0.27 0.19 
47 Khabarovsk Krai 65.50 12.15 0.19 0.2 
48 Yamal-Nenets  АО 85.86 3.44 0.47 0.19 
49 Republic of Dagestan 130.00 3.02 0.53 0.12 
Source: authors calculations based on RF Ministry of Finance and State Statistics Committee data.  
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IGFR Reforms at the Federal Level as Compared with IGFR Reforms in the Regions 
In spite of the obvious successes of the IGFR reform between the federal center and the 
regions, subnational fiscal relations need a thorough reconstruction. The IGFR reform initiated 
and carried out by the federal government will have a positive effect on regional finance. 
Regional governments will have to adopt a more rational attitude towards use of budgetary 
resources under the influence of a formalized procedure for providing financial assistance from 
the federal budget, stimulation of tax efforts and budget expenditures rationalization envisaged 
in the transfer formula. Nevertheless, this process is slowed down by the following 
intergovernmental problems at the federal level that have not been resolved yet: 
 insufficient decentralization of public finance management and an extremely high share of 
conditional revenues and expenditures in the budgets of the RF subjects and municipalities 
(i.e. those that are determined by higher governments); 
 a risk of greater control over regional and local governments rather than territorial branches 
of federal agencies owing to the federal centers desire to strengthen the vertical alignment 
of power; 
 preservation of informal financial assistance channels; 
 soft budgetary constrains; 
 the yet unresolved problem of unfunded federal and regional mandates; 
 lack of clearance in delineation of expenditure responsibilities between different levels of 
government; 
 delineation of revenue sources that are inadequate for expenditure responsibilities; 
 the number of the budgetary system levels envisaged by law does not correspond to the 
actual number of levels of public government; 
 shortcomings of the public finance legislature. 
As a consequence, despite some obvious achievements in the IGFR reform at the federal 
level, the situation with regional finance including intergovernmental relations in most RF 
regions does not correspond to the requirements of market reforms that are carried out and needs 
a radical change. Regional public finance is still characterized by the following features: 
1. A lack of understanding of the role of public government in a market economy and the 
purpose of budget spending. Instead of such functions as provision of access to services and 
goods that have no market demand though are socially important, efforts are made to create 
a favorable business climate, to prevent private business negative impacts on the 
environment and population, to redistribute peoples incomes along equalization lines and to 
secure stable conditions for economic and social development.   
2. Instead of performing functions associated with provision of public services and goods, 
regional governments are busy in governing the whole of economy in their jurisdictions. The 
state is not very active in withdrawing from business and giving an opportunity to the private  
sector to produce market goods and services. While pursuing populist aims, regional 
governments use a considerable part of budget funds to support ineffective businesses both 
through direct subsidies and various privileges and benefits.   
3. Irresponsible attitude to regional and federal finance owing, in the first place, to soft 
budgetary constrains and considerable imputed expenditures. A possibility to receive 
additional, not envisaged by budget, money as a result of actual excess spending of 
budgetary funds results in less responsibility for collecting own budgetary revenues and 
pursuing a prudential spending policy.  
4. Adherence of regional governments to the old-fashioned system of centralized management. 
Regional finance is viewed and managed as a single centralized system, its main function 
being to finance current social infrastructure facilities irrespective of their regional or 
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municipal jurisdiction. The process of regional financial assistance allocation to local 
governments is based on negotiation skills rather than on a formalized method. Also, instead 
of objective criteria, such as revenue capacity and unit costs of budget expenditures in a 
territory, subjective factors are taken into consideration.  
5. Lack of confidence on the part of regional governments in the capability of lower 
governments to use financial resources with due responsibility. This is further enhanced by a 
mismatch of revenue sources and staff capacity of local governments to responsibilities 
assigned to them. As a result, though most governors recognize the advantages of the new 
formalized model of fiscal relations between the federal center and the regions, they more 
often than not adhere to an opposite model of relations between regions and municipalities 
giving preference to the so-called paternalistic model.  
6. A lack of stability in the allocation of financial assistance mechanism. This is caused not 
only by the fact that in most cases intergovernmental relations are based on negotiations but 
also by the instability of the national tax and budgetary system. The efforts aimed at 
reforming the system result in annual changes in revenue composition of subregional 
budgets.  
The legislature on public finance and budgetary system that is far from perfect also 
contributes to low effectiveness of regional finance and intergovernmental relations. Also, this 
legislation contradicts the legislation on the administrative and territorial system, local 
government, social guarantees etc.   
The current budget legislation does not allow for a proper alignment of responsibilities 
or jurisdictions among the levels of government. Governments responsibilities to provide goods 
and services at the expense of budget funds are substituted with responsibilities to maintain 
agencies accommodated in buildings and constructions transferred into ownership of a relevant 
government. But even such assignment turns out to be ambiguous from the point of view of 
delineation of individual types of expenditures. In most cases the role of expenditure 
responsibilities is played by obligations that were imputed by higher governments but not 
adequately funded at the same time. Besides, the practice of assigning individual functions to 
different levels of government contradicts the rules of a most rational system of public service 
provision.   
The tax reform that has been carried out during recent years addresses the taxpayer in the 
first place. It is practically of no importance for the recipients of taxes, i.e. for the way tax 
revenues are entered into the different levels of the budgetary system. The present model of 
differentiation of taxes into federal, regional and local does not correspond to the actual system 
of expenditure subdivision. The volume of intergovernmental monetary flows tends to grow 
owing to the allocation of tax revenues to the different levels of the budgetary system in 
accordance with the Tax Code. The primary reason for this is the reduction of own revenues of 
local governments caused by the abolition of a number of local taxes.  
Among other factors that have a negative impact on intergovernmental fiscal relations 
and the state of regional finance are the shortcomings of the current law on the administrative 
and territorial system. The fact that public government in the Russian Federation has four and 
even five levels has not been recognized and thus the provisions of the Tax and Budget codes 
cover only three levels of the budgetary system. This also adds to ineffective assignment of 
expenditure responsibilities and revenue sources at the subregional level. The imperfections of 
the above law are also responsible for a common mismatch between tax capacities of 
jurisdictions at the different levels of government and expenditure responsibilities assigned to 
them.   
Unfortunately, the local government legislation that is invaluable for the development of 
a civic society and social responsibility very often generates a parasitic attitude  and 
irresponsibility of municipal authorities. Being deprived of real expenditure and revenue powers, 
local government becomes a fiction. Most of those functions that are assigned to municipal 
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governments differ from local functions in developed economies. In the Russian Federation, 
local authorities are in fact guarantors of the responsibilities of all levels of public government.   
The sizes of social benefits and support provided to individual categories of the 
population and envisaged by the law on social guarantees to the population do not agree with 
the revenue capacity of the national consolidated budget. Besides, although this is a federal law 
it makes lower governments responsible for its compliance. Even in those cases when the 
assignment of responsibilities is accompanied by allocation of federal funds, the latter often 
appear to be insufficient for proper execution of such responsibilities. At the same time this 
cannot be proved in court owing to the imperfection of the relevant legislation.  
 
Recommendations on Improvements of the RF Budgetary System at the Subregional Level  
As has been demonstrated above, the actual structure of public government in the 
Russian Federation has four levels while the budget and tax legislation covers only three levels 
of the budgetary system. As a consequence, the system of public finance is not efficient. The 
federal legislation envisages tax and expenditure responsibilities for a single local government; 
as a result, large cities (such as capitals of RF subjects), raions that include a great number of 
small towns and settlements as well as rural settlements, provided they are registered as 
municipalities, have the same responsibilities.  
The amounts of revenue received by municipalities from those taxes that are assigned to 
them by the current federal legislation are not enough to cover their expenditure responsibilities.   
Thus, only 13 percent of expenditures of an average statistical municipality were covered in 
1999 by local tax revenues. The share will become even less following the annulment of a 
number of local taxes and fees by the RF Tax Code. At the same time the budget legislation 
assigns significant expenditure responsibilities to municipalities, including those in connection 
with education and healthcare that are guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the expenditure 
responsibilities of sub-raion municipalities do not correspond to their status. At the same time, 
revenue sources of large cities and raions do not meet the expenditure responsibilities assigned 
to them.  
The problem is aggravated by those norms of the federal legislation that allow formation 
of local self-governments within any territorial boundaries. The practice when sub-raion 
municipalities are formed spontaneously or in accordance with political biases of regional 
authorities leads to the following negative consequences:  
 the size of a territory within the jurisdiction of a municipality (and, consequently, the 
coverage by public services) does not correspond to the expenditure and functional 
responsibilities of the local self-government assigned to it by legislation;  
 the fragmented and unevenly distributed revenue base of local governments does not 
conform to the territorial distribution of needs in public services; 
 the managerial staff of local governments does not cope with the assigned responsibilities; 
 as a consequence, local governments and population seek for support from outside. 
It is recommended to solve the problem by providing a legislative status to the forth level 
of the budgetary system in compliance with the fourth level of public government. It is 
suggested that the additional level of the budgetary system is formed at the sub-regional level 
while its specific forms with all the attributes (first of all, appointments by election and 
budgetary powers) will be within the scope of authority of the appropriate region or regulated by 
the federal legislation (in which case the latter will be amended as necessary). In any case, the 
amendments in the following areas of the federal legislation will be recommended: 
• the RF subjects are to be authorized to delegate their tax responsibilities (i.e. to allocate tax 
sources and to set tax rates) and the corresponding expenditure  responsibilities to the lower 
levels, or  
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• a priori delineation of revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities between the third and 
forth levels of the budgetary system should be made. 
As a result, a RF subject, in accordance with the current legislation, will be able to 
choose the organizational form of its sub-regional governments:  
• a two-tier system of state power and one-tier municipalities (i.e., elective state power in 
raions and, possibly, in large cities to be paralleled by municipal governments responsible 
for the issues other that those guaranteed by the State), or  
• one-tier state power of the RF subject and two-tier municipal governments. 
 The main difference between the two is the way the scope of responsibilities of the 
medium level of regional government will be determined: whether it will be the law of a RF 
subject (in the first case) or the opinion of the population as stipulated by the Federal Law On 
General Principles of Local Self-government Organization in the Russian Federation.  
The IGFR between the medium and the bottom level of public government in a region 
might be regulated by its framework laws while the medium government will also retain certain 
powers in this respect. 
The laws on administrative and territorial structure that are in force now in most RF 
subjects have no practical importance for the organization of local governments. Public law does 
not even define the administrative and territorial division and its role in public government 
organization. The only clarification on it is contained in the Ruling of the RF Constitutional 
Court of January 24, 1997, where it is specified that the administrative and territorial division 
form a territorial basis for setting up local representative and executive authorities in the regions. 
No local bodies of state power may be established in those territories that do not have the status 
of an administrative-territorial entity. However, no region so far has created representative 
bodies of state power at the sub-regional level. Accordingly, the object to be regulated by such 
legislation is absent from the RF subjects. 
This should be a genuinely effective law that will have an influence on the formation of 
subnational governments and, accordingly, on the budgetary system of the RF subjects. The 
Constitution (Charter) of a RF subject should provide a list of entities within its jurisdiction, be 
it raion (city) bodies of state power or municipalities of the first level. These entities of the RF 
subjects will be the IGFR partners of the regional governments at the regional level.  
The RF subjects will be recommended to formulate their own administrative and 
territorial division based on the most rational organization of public government aimed at 
effective rendering of public services.  
Thus, when taking decisions on the administrative-territorial boundaries (be it bodies of 
state or municipal power) it is recommended to take into account the size of the area where 
public services will be rendered by a budget organization (or by a body of local self-
government) most effectively.   
It should also be kept in mind that territorial fragmentation (when jurisdictions become 
ever smaller) usually adds to the uneven tax base distribution across municipalities. This means 
both an uneven distribution of wealthier population and an uneven location of legal entity 
taxpayers across municipalities. Usually, larger jurisdictions include both wealthy and poor 
areas whose tax input is counterbalanced. As a rule, expenditure needs of such municipalities are 
also counterbalanced: poorer areas have higher expenditure needs because their population 
requires more public assistance and services.  
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The way in which such differences across jurisdictions influence the financial base of 
local governments depends on the tax system and the model of tax revenue distribution across 
local governments. 
Western federative states provide several models of public government organization at 
the local level and their financial relations with the higher tiers of government. Most federative 
states have a two-tier system of local governments and the sizes of jurisdictions of both levels 
may vary from country to country. Of the main importance are the issues of compatibility of 
sizes of local jurisdictions to revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities assigned to them.  
The reform of the budgetary system at the regional level in accordance with the above 
principles and recommendations will make it possible to do the following: 
• assign to different levels of the budgetary system their individual expenditure responsibilities 
and revenue sources; 
• form territorial boundaries for regional governments of the medium level (at this level the 
Constitutional guarantees regarding education and healthcare services will be fulfilled) with 
a view of maximum compatibility of available revenue sources to their expenditure 
responsibilities (for instance, a raion and its cities could be united into a single municipality); 
• resulting from this, the amounts of financial assistance from the regional budget for fiscal 
capacity equalization purposes will be decreased; 
• increase the liability of each level of government for the revenue and expenditure  
responsibilities assigned to them; 
• promote actual participation of residents of municipalities in budget finance management. 
 
*** 
 
To summarize the above, one may state that today about half of tax revenue of the RF 
consolidated budget and some 60 percent of expenditures account for subnational (regional and 
local) budgets. In this respect Russia yields to no other federalist country and even surpasses 
them as far as the local government share (25 percent) is concerned. Nevertheless, it is too early 
to speak about real decentralization of public government in Russia.12  
                                                 
12 According to the IMF data, in mid-1990s the share of subnational budgets in the USA was 46 percent, of 
which local budgets accounted for 20 percent; in Canada, the figures were 54 and 12 percent and in 
Germany, 53 and 16 percent accordingly.  
